Product direction

Know whether an agent can still complete the journey.

AgentReady is building toward uptime monitoring for AI-agent journeys. The planned loop would define a task and safe boundary, run it with a calibrated reference agent, save sanitized evidence, then rerun the same contract after a product changes. The production journey runner is not live today.

The recurring product loop

Define → run → prove → compare → alert

01

Define one outcome

Choose a start URL, exact allowed origins, safe navigation steps, and deterministic assertions.

02

Capture a receipt

Record sanitized step outcomes, content hashes, timing, methodology, and the first terminal state.

03

Detect regression

Tie each baseline to its journey version, retry bounded flakes, and alert only on comparable evidence.

Foundation · gated · coming after security gates

Authenticated journeys without collecting passwords

The planned capability would begin after a customer signs in through their own browser. AgentReady would receive an expiring, encrypted session handoff bound to the project and approved origins. A fresh browser context could navigate and inspect; the first contract would not fill arbitrary forms, invoke arbitrary buttons, purchase, publish, send, or download. The runner and customer-safe login relay are not live today.

What the gated foundation is designed to prove

  • Whether an approved signed-in page is reachable.
  • Whether named links and outcomes are observable.
  • Whether deterministic assertions pass in a fresh context.
  • Whether the next requested action stays inside policy.

What remains outside the claim

  • No password collection or identity proof.
  • No claim of airtight remote-browser network isolation until independently verified.
  • No screenshots, traces, HTML, cookies, or entered values in public evidence.
  • No consequential action without a separate future authorization design.

Terminal states that preserve the reason

A failed assertion is different from missing authorization or a provider outage. The run keeps those denominators separate.

passed
Every deterministic assertion was observed true.
assertion_failed
The page was observable and at least one deterministic assertion was false.
halted_by_policy
The journey requested a destination or action outside the allowlist.
agent_incomplete
The reference agent stopped without reaching an assertion or another terminal state.
bot_blocked
A challenge or access rule blocked the reference agent before the outcome was observable.
degraded_provider
The browser provider failed before enough evidence was collected.
needs_reauth
The imported session was missing, expired, revoked, or redirected to login.
unobservable
The page loaded, but the requested outcome could not be inspected reliably.
timed_out
The bounded run reached its time limit before a more specific terminal state.

Specification-aware design · gated

MCP preflight will separate protocol behavior from security claims.

The proposed preflight uses version-aware discovery and tool-list negotiation, schema consistency, typed errors, and harmless fixture behavior. It will not call arbitrary tools or present conformance as a security certification. The current published MCP endpoint continues to expose AgentReady's own public diagnostic tools; testing someone else's server remains gated.

Questions teams ask first

Does a passing AgentReady journey prove ChatGPT or Claude can finish the task?

No. It is evidence that a calibrated reference agent completed the defined journey under a named policy, browser, fixture, and methodology version. It is not proof about every provider, model, account, geography, or future run.

Can AgentReady test a signed-in product?

Authenticated journeys are a gated foundation, not part of the anonymous public scan, and the production runner and customer-safe login relay are not live. The intended handoff would import an expiring browser session after the customer logs in; AgentReady would not ask for or store the account password.

Will the runner submit a purchase or create real records?

Not in the first release. The reference-agent policy is read-only and deny-by-default. Consequential actions, arbitrary buttons, downloads, permissions, WebSockets, and unapproved destinations halt the run.

How is this different from a generic end-to-end test?

The journey combines agent-facing findability and interface evidence with deterministic end-state assertions, explicit policy stops, sanitized receipts, and a versioned baseline that can be rerun after changes.